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I. INTRODUCTION
Television programming changed drastically over the last few years.
Reality television erupted on every major network, while the popularity
1
of sitcoms and other daytime television shows diminished. College
sports games now share the spotlight with professional sports games,
2
and may be more appealing to some sports fans. Reality television stars
and amateur athletes (hereafter referred to as “Emerging Celebrities”)
play a large role in the billions–of–dollars generated from television

1. See Alexis Miller, Comment, Reality Check for Production Companies: Why Writers
on Reality Television are Entitled to Overtime Pay, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 185, 185-86 (2007);
Richard Verrier, No Time for Making New ‘Friends' at NBC?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at
C1.
2. See Ivan Maisel, Passion, Tradition Elevate College Football Over NFL, ESPN.COM
(Aug.
15,
2006
3:16
PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/preview06/columns/
story?columnist=maisel_ivan&id=2549750.
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airplay each year. Unfortunately, industry standard contracts force
these Emerging Celebrities to give up significant control of their image,
which leads to the loss of potential income. Current law forces
Emerging Celebrities to attribute these major losses to the cost of fame,
often because they knowingly signed and entered into agreements that
4
expressly forfeited certain rights to their persona.
If this major gap in American contract law and mainstream
entertainment continues to exist, Emerging Celebrities will continue to
forfeit millions–of–dollars of potential income. This Comment will
discuss the potential legal injustice of standard contracts used in the
reality television and amateur sports industries, and propose a potential
statutory solution. Part II will discuss the history and development of
publicity rights in the United States. Next, Part III will briefly discuss
the various statutes currently in effect to protect publicity rights. Then,
Part IV will discuss how current industry standard contracts force
Emerging Celebrities to forfeit a substantial and valuable portion of
their publicity rights. Finally, Part V will discuss a proposed statute that
would prohibit enforcement of publicity rights clauses that force
Emerging Celebrities to assign excessive portions of a their publicity
rights to another person or entity.
II. THE LAW OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Modern right of publicity law consists of a dichotomy of privacy law
5
and property law. The right to privacy is grounded in the belief that
individuals reserve the right to be free from having their image ruined
6
by “idle gossip” or negative statements published in the press. The
economic basis for the right of publicity recognizes an individual’s right
to own a property-type interest in his or her marketable image, which
includes his or her name, picture, likeness, voice, and other personal
3. See
Reality
TV—A
Brief
History,
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY,
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/soc499/cordray/media/Realitytv.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2012); Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust
Case, SI.COM (July 22, 2009 9:51 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers
/michael_mccann/07/21/ncaa/index.html.
4. See NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL § 12.5 (Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
2001)[hereinafter D1 MANUAL]; Debora Halbert, Who Owns Your Personality: Reality
Television and Publicity Rights, in SURVIVOR LESSONS: ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATION AND
REALITY TELEVISION 37, 44 (Matthew J. Smith & Andrew F. Wood eds., 2003).
5. HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND PERSONALITY 9
(2005); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1020 (5th ed. 2009).
6. MERGES, supra note 5.
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7

characteristics. Modern legal trends led to various state statutes and
8
cases that give this area of law more defined standards.
A. Right to be Let Alone

9

Legal Scholars first discussed the right of publicity in the
nineteenth–century under the guise of the right of privacy. The
invention of the printing press and flash photography brought about
10
issues of men wishing “to be let alone” in their private lives. In the late
1800s, legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis noted that the
unauthorized circulation of private photographs along with gossip was
becoming a trade in the newspaper industry, and necessitated legal
11
protection for an individual’s privacy.
They asserted that the
protections afforded to the intellectual property of every person are the
same types of protections that each person should be afforded for his or
12
her publicity. Ultimately, Warren and Brandeis felt that the invasion
of an individual’s privacy constituted an actionable tort claim, and to
date a majority of legal scholars and professionals have agreed with
13
them.
Despite the majority eventually following Warren and Brandeis’
theory, everybody did not immediately accept their position. Only
twelve years after the publication of their privacy theories, a New York
appellate court found that a right to privacy was not actionable absent
14
libel (malicious gossip). At the time of the decision, New York law
15
recognized libel as a tort. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, Co., a
flourmill company knowingly printed and circulated the likeness of an
infant child on its packages of flour without receiving permission from
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
10. See id. at 195–96.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 197–200.
13. Id. at 219; see Pollyana Kwok, The Use of a Celebrity’s Name and Likeness in
News Stories in Conjunction with Advertisements—Celebrities Seeking Broader Protections, 32
SW. L. REV. 761 (2003); but see Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warrne and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983); Judith
Endejan, The Tort of Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin’s New Privacy
Law, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 1029, 1932 (1970) (citing Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American
Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 254 (1966); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12
COLUMN. L. REV. 693 (1912); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941)).
14. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556-57 (N.Y. 1902).
15. Id.
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the child’s parents.
Soon thereafter, the child’s parents sought
monetary damages, as well as an injunction to prevent further
17
circulation of the image. Though the majority found that these events
did not lead to a cause of action, the dissent argued that the right to
privacy gave rise to a cause of action and should be a legally accepted
18
principle.
In the aftermath of this case, the New York legislature
decided to enact a privacy statute that followed the dissent’s argument
and made it a tort to use a person’s image for commercial purposes
19
without that person’s consent.
This case became the precursor to
several other states and jurisdictions that would later enact laws to
20
protect one’s personal image.
B. Distinguishing Publicity from Privacy
As publicity law developed, a murky line appeared between the
difference of privacy law and publicity law. A federal court drew a
distinction between the two in the 1953 case Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v.
21
Topps Chewing Gum.
There, a federal circuit judge distinguished
publicity rights of an individual from privacy rights by focusing on the
22
economic interests of the plaintiff’s persona. The lawsuit between the
two rival chewing gum companies arose from a dispute regarding the
use of a well-known, professional baseball player’s (“Player”)
23
photograph for advertising and selling purposes. The plaintiff, Haelen
Laboratories, Inc. (“Haelen”), sold, manufactured, and distributed
24
chewing gum. Haelen had entered into a contract with the Player in
which he authorized Haelen to use his photograph in connection with
25
the advertising and selling of Haelen’s products. As a condition of the
contract, the Player agreed not to grant other rival companies the right

16. Id. at 542.
17. Id. at 542–43.
18. Id. at 560.
19. BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 5 at 50; N.Y. Laws 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1–2. The
statute enacted in 1903 still exists in the same form under NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§
50–51 (McKinney 2011).
20. CAL. CODE 3344.1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. 32-36-1-1 (West 2002);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.770 to 597.810 (1995); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney
1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(2)(b) (West 1997).
21. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 867.
25. Id.
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to use his photograph to advertise or sell the rival companies products.
With full knowledge of the contract between the Player and Haelen,
Haelen’s rival and the defendant in the case—Topps Chewing Gum
(“Topps”)—deliberately induced the Player to enter into a contract that
allowed Topps to also use the Player’s photograph in connection with
27
advertising and selling. Haelen brought suit against Topps alleging
that it deliberately invaded Haelen’s right to exclusively use the Player’s
28
photograph for its business purposes.
In court, Topps argued that by inducing the Player to enter into a
contract with Topps, the only actionable tort would be a statutory
invasion of privacy, which was a personal interest and not an assignable
29
property interest. Therefore, Topps argued that Haelen did not have
an actionable claim because it could not have received a property
30
interest from the contract it entered into with the Player. A majority
of the court rejected this argument and determined that every person
31
has a right of publicity independent of his or her right of privacy. More
specifically, the right of publicity consisted of the person’s value in his
32
photograph, image, or likeness. The court further noted that the value
of a person’s publicity right rested in each person’s right to exclusively
33
grant the use of his publicity as he so choses. Essentially, this ruling
distinguished the difference between a person’s right to be left alone to
his private affairs and his right to benefit from granting others the right
to use his image for commercial purposes.
C. Right of Publicity in the Light of Public Policy
Recent case law shows that courts have acknowledged that certain
contract terms containing publicity rights clauses should be considered
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. For example, in 2006 a
Missouri court determined that when parties enter into an agreement
granting a party the right to use a celebrity’s publicity rights, courts
might find certain provisions of a licensing agreement unenforceable
34
because of public policy considerations. There, in C.B.C. Distribution
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Haelan Lab., Inc., 202 F.2d at 867–68.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 867–68.
Id.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Haelan Lab., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
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and Marketing v. MLB Advanced Media, the court found that public
policy considerations made two provisions, a no-challenge provision and
a provision that prohibited C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing (“CBC”)
from using the name and certain information of Major League Baseball
35
players, unenforceable and void.
The plaintiff in this instance, CBC, markets, sells, and distributes
36
fantasy sports products online, including fantasy baseball games. The
defendant, Advanced Media, operates the interactive and Internet
37
aspect of Major League Baseball (MLB). Prior to the beginning of the
professional baseball season, participants “draft” or select players for
38
their fantasy baseball teams. CBC provides the participants with a list
39
of actual MLB players that the participants may draft for their team.
The overall outcome and success of a fantasy player’s team depends on
40
the selection of these MLB players. CBC also provides the most up-todate information on MLB players, which is comprised of statistics,
41
injury reports, player profiles, and player information.
In 2002, the MLB Players’ Association (Association) entered into a
licensing agreement with CBC on behalf of active professional baseball
42
players in the National and American Leagues.
This agreement
contained two clauses, which later became the center of the legal
43
dispute. The first provision, the no-challenge provision, provided that
the CBC could not dispute or attack the title or any rights of the
44
Association, or the license’s validity. The second provision provided
that CBC should refrain from use of the licensed rights and any direct or
indirect reference to them upon the expiration of the licensing
45
agreement.
Between 2001 and 2004, Advanced Media operated a fantasy
46
baseball league on the MLB website. In 2005, Advanced Media and
the Association entered into a licensing agreement where Advanced
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
35. Id. at 1106–07.
36. Id. at 1080.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
41. Id. This information may usually be found in the sports section of any newspaper.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1081.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
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Media obtained the right to use the players’ publicity rights for the
47
purpose of exploitation through interactive media. In January 2005,
Advanced Media solicited proposals from various fantasy league
operators to enter into an agreement to participate in Advanced
48
Media’s fantasy baseball licensing program.
In February 2005,
Advanced Media offered CBC a license where it could use MLB marks
to promote fantasy games on MLB.com to CBC customers, and CBC
would receive a ten percent share of revenues from MLB’s fantasy
49
games.
A few days after receiving the above offer, CBC filed a Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment in federal district court claiming that it
reasonably apprehended Advanced Media suing it if CBC continued to
50
operate its fantasy baseball league. CBC also alleged that Advanced
Media maintained all players’ statistics and information and could
preclude all fantasy sports operators from offering products to the
51
consuming public. CBC also requested an injunction from Advanced
Media or any of its affiliates from interfering in CBC’s business
52
operations.
Advanced Media counterclaimed, stating that CBC
breached its contract agreement by operating its fantasy baseball league
without a license because CBC was using the publicity rights of players
53
beyond the scope of their agreement.
The court acknowledged that the language of the 2002 agreement
contained a no-challenge provision, and noted the agreement restricted
CBC from using players’ rights of publicity after the termination of the
54
agreement. CBC contended that the provisions of the agreement were
55
void as a matter of public policy. CBC also argued that no-challenge
56
The
provisions were contrary to the Lanham Act’s public policy.
court agreed, and held that a certification mark could not be prohibited
57
by licensee estoppel.
Advanced Media argued that CBC had permission to use players’

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–82.
Id. at 1102–03.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
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58

records, just not the players’ names. However, the court determined
that a player’s record without a name would be pointless and
59
To determine whether the publicity
meaningless in this instance.
provisions of the contract were enforceable, the court relied on
authority that stated, “strong federal policy favoring the full and free
use of ideas in the public domain outweigh[ed] the public interest
60
against the competing demands of patent and contract law.” This case
is important because it shows that courts are willing to consider public
policy factors when determining the validity of a contract that involves
publicity rights.
III. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
61

In the United States, publicity rights are governed by states. Even
though the right is commonly associated with celebrities, some states
62
Accordingly,
allow protection for non-famous individuals as well.
several states have enacted statutes in order to codify their particular
63
protections of individuals’ publicity rights. Currently, nineteen states
64
recognize the right of publicity by statute. And the subject matter of
65
these statutes covers a broad range of topics.
For instance, Indiana has an extremely extensive and detailed right
66
of publicity statute. Indiana is significant to student athletes because
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which governs
most major intercollegiate athletics programs, is headquartered in
Indianapolis and complaining parties can sue the NCAA in Indiana’s
67
courts. Indiana extends the protection of publicity rights to include not
only a person’s name and likeness, but also a person’s mannerisms,

58. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Statutes, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited
Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Statutes].
62.
Right of Publicity, U.S. LEGAL, http://entertainmentlaw.uslegal.com/right-ofpublicity (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter R.O.P.]; Sara J. Crasson, The Limited
Protections of Intellectual Property Law for the Variety Arts: Protecting Zacchini, Houdini,
and Cirque Du Soleil, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J., 73, 95 (2012).
63. Statutes, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See IND. CODE Ann. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2011).
67. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Contact Us,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/home/contact+the+ncaa (last visited Mar.
9, 2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
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signatures, gestures, pictures, and distinctive appearance.
Furthermore, Indiana specifically prohibits enforcing agreements in
which student–athletes grant publicity rights to sports agents in certain
69
situations. Additionally, some states, like California and Indiana, place
a high emphasis on the property value of publicity rights as evidenced
by the statutes, which allow for the descent and devise of property rights
70
to a deceased’s heirs.
Currently, New York is in the process of
attempting to amend its right of publicity statute to add additional
protections to individuals, but the statute has not survived the recent
71
legislative sessions. Overall, the right of publicity law is continually
and rapidly evolving, and expanding in several of the states.
IV. SIGNING THEIR LIVES AWAY
For celebrities and Emerging Celebrities alike, the proprietary
interests associated with their names, likenesses, and personas prove to
be extremely valuable. However, in order to participate as a student
athlete in college sports or as a personality on a reality television show,
participants must sign industry standard, non-negotiable contracts that
72
include clauses giving up large amounts of those rights. With these
standard contracts, participants have no opportunity to negotiate the
terms, including the contractual language related to publicity rights. As
a result, Emerging Celebrities give up an unfathomable amounts of their
ability to control or use their own publicity.
A. The NCAA Swindle
The NCAA governs athletic competition between sports teams at a
73
majority of collegiate institutions in the United States. In order for
college athletes to participate in NCAA athletic programs, the student
athletes must enter into a contractual relationship with their respective
university by way of the National Letter of Intent, the Statement of
74
Financial Assistance, and other documents. Through this contractual
68. Id.
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8 (West 2011).
70. R.O.P., supra note 62; IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-6 (West 2011); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344.1(1)(a) (West 2012).
71. Statutes, supra note 61.
72. DI MANUAL, supra note 4, § 12.5; Halbert, supra note 4 at 44.
73. See
NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION,
History,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+
ncaa+history (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter NCAA History].
74. MATTHEW J. MITTEN & TIMOTHY DAVIS, SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION:
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relationship, the student athlete promises to attend the university and
participate in its athletics program, and the university agrees to provide
financial aid for the cost of attending its university along with the
opportunity for the student athlete to receive an education at that
75
institution. In this contractual relationship, the student athlete agrees
to follow all rules of that particular institution’s athletics program,
76
athletic conference, and athletic association.
The NCAA contends that one of its main missions is to foster
77
amateurism in college sports, thereby offering a justification for its
severe limits to the activities of student athletes both on and off of the
78
field. Under the NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws, student athletes
are prohibited from profiting or benefiting in any way from fame
79
generated from their athletic abilities and achievement as an athlete.
Not only do NCAA rules prohibit student athletes from personally
using their own names or the publicity from their achievements, the
NCAA mandates that student athletes grant permission to the NCAA,
the students’ institutions, and the institutions’ respective conferences to
use the students’ images, names, and likenesses for any and all of their
80
promotional activities. Given the seemingly unequal consideration in
the relationship between student athletes and their universities, it is not
surprising that the National Letter of Intent has been criticized for the
81
adhesive nature of the contractual relationship.
In recent years, former student athletes have begun to fight this
exploitation of publicity rights. For instance, the class action case of
O’Bannon v. NCAA arose out of frustrated former athletes who felt as
though the NCAA should not control their publicity rights in the
collegiate licensing industry; an industry whose profits are estimated to
82
be at about four–billion dollars per year. Ed O’Bannon (O’Bannon)
and other former athletes complained, among other things, that the
83
NCAA was intentionally depriving them of their right of publicity.

CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 111 (2009).
75. Id. at 111–12.
76. Id. at 114.
77. DI MANUAL, supra note 4, § 1.2(c).
78. See id.
79. Id. § 12.4.1.1.
80. Id. § 12.5.
81. MITTEN & DAVIS, supra note 74 at 112.
82. Complaint at 33, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2009 WL 2416720
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 09-03329 BZ); McCann, supra note 3.
83. Id.
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Currently, the NCAA controls the publicity rights of current and former
athletes in various commercial ventures including the sale and
distribution of commemorative DVD’s, the broadcast of past games,
84
and sports–related video games.
The main point of contention in O’Bannon is form 08-3a (Student
85
Athlete Statement). This form is one of many forms student athletes
86
are required to sign in order to participate in collegiate athletics. The
form essentially grants the NCAA the right to use the athletes’ names
87
and images in perpetuity. The former athletes contend that without
signing these documents they would not have otherwise been able to
receive a scholarship for a college education, while the NCAA
continues to maintain that its only purpose in diverting the funds from
88
the athletes is to keep college sports pure.
O’Bannon and other NCAA athletes rightly believe that the NCAA
has taken away too much of their publicity rights. Most NCAA college
athletes have a maximum of five years to participate in athletics for four
89
seasons before they exhaust their athletic eligibility. However, in order
to participate in a competitive sports program, the NCAA forces these
college athletes to agree to give up their publicity rights for the rest of
90
their lives. Even though it may be argued that the athletes have the
option of either not participating in sports or going to a school in a
different athletic conference, those alternatives are not really
reasonable or fair, especially when comparing the NCAA to a non91
NCAA athletic conference.
Student athletes should not be forced to choose between retaining
their publicity rights and attending an institution that may best fit their
future goals. This especially holds true for student athletes who aim to
become professional athletes. Student athletes who wish to go pro have
a better opportunity to enter into a professional draft by playing for a
NCAA member institution than any other athletic conferences.
84.
85.

McCann, supra note 82.
Id.; see generally Form 08-3a, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY ATHLETICS
COMPLIANCE, http://www.ukathletics.com/doc_lib/compliance0809_sa_statement.pdf (last
visited Mar. 21, 2011).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. D1 Manual, supra note 4, at § 14.1.8.2.1.3.
90. Id. § 12.5.
91. Why Should I Consider an NAIA School?, ATHLETICRECRUITINGMENTOR.COM,
http://athleticrecruitingmentor.com/WhyShouldIConsideranNAIASchool.aspx (last visited
Nov. 13, 2011).
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Overall, the NCAA is basically manipulating NCAA student athletes
into giving up the right to take ownership in their identity as student
athletes.
B. The Reality Is . . . the T.V. Networks Own You
Like student athletes, reality television personalities also have to
give up a substantial portion of their publicity rights. Anyone who
wants to participate in a reality television show must sign a series of
92
documents, which includes agreements, releases, and waivers. These
documents essentially allows the production company to have complete
93
control over the soon–to–be reality stars. In addition to the stack of
documents that releases the company from almost any or all liability
should an accident arise; at some point, the up-and-coming reality star
will sign a document that will give his publicity rights in association with
94
the show entirely to the production company into perpetuity.
Ironically, the production company’s control over the reality star’s
publicity lasts longer than the Emerging Celebrities fifteen minutes of
fame.
The popularity of reality television personalities grew with the
popularity of reality television. This phenomena of “reality” television
emerged as television producers began placing real life people on
95
television shows in order to portray the drama of ever day life. In most
reality television series, the television network takes ownership of the
reality starss personas for a period of time that usually extends through
96
the end of the stars’ popularity. In addition, the network retains the
right to continue to air reruns and utilize footage of the reality stars
97
forever.
Take for example, the CBS series Survivor. Survivor participants
agree to allow CBS to control their publicity rights for three years
98
following the airing of the program. In the past, television networks
commonly took ownership of the publicity rights of the characters that

92.
See Kedon Willis, 10 Things Reality TV Won’t Tell You, SMARTMONEY MAG.
(Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/10-things-reality-tv-wont-tellyou-22427.
93. Id.
94. See Halbert, supra note 4, at 44.
95. See id. at 37.
96. See id. at 44.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 37.

FARR- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/10/2012 1:22 PM

WHAT GOOD IS FAME?

479
99

an actor portrayed on a sitcom or other daytime show. However, since
reality stars essentially portray themselves on screen this method no
100
longer works. Previously, sitcom and other television stars sliced away
101
pieces of their personas for use by the television networks. However,
this new group of reality stars has no ownership whatsoever over their
publicity rights and cannot control their public images after releasing
102
their publicity rights.
Like Survivor, shows like MTV’s The Real World and NBC’s
America’s Got Talent are continually expanding their contractual
language in order to ensure that they do not miss opportunities to
103
control and exploit the participants’ television rights.
Contracts for
shows like these include language such as “to perpetuity and throughout
the universe” and “including the rights to your life story,” when
describing the television network retaining the publicity rights of the
104
shows’ participants.
In discussing the ridiculousness of these
exaggerated contractual terms, Lucasfilm’s Lynne Hale commented that
television networks have actually “had very few cases of people trying
105
to exploit rights on other planets.” However, that has not stopped the
television networks and production companies that are determined to
ensure that they control any and all rights.
Following their brief appearances on television, reality stars soon
discover just how limited they are in using their own publicity. For
example, following his appearance on Survivor, Richard Hatch wanted
to capitalize on his fame as “The Survivor” and allow a childhood
106
friend, Peter Lance, to ghost write his life experiences. However, due
to the language of contracts signed between Hatch and CBS, the project
107
was prevented. Not only could Hatch not share his experiences for the
purpose of writing his book, CBS also prevented Hatch and all other
99. Id. at 38.
100. Halbert, supra note 4, at 38.
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id.
103. See id.; Dionne Searcey & James R. Hagerty, Lawyerese Goes Galactic as
Contracts Try to Master the Universe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125658217507308619.html; see Exhibit A, Declaration of
Golzar Amirmotazedi, Amirmotazedi v. Viacom, 768 F. Supp. 256 (D. D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10cv-00765-GK).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Kathy Kehrli, The Stingray: Lethal Tactics of the Sole Survivor (June 16, 2011),
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/books_missed/70526.
107. Id.
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contestants from sharing experiences at any public venues without prior
108
Hatch is virtually silenced forever from
approval from the network.
sharing his experiences and stories with other people.
The same agreement prevented Survivors Jenna Lewis and Gervase
Peterson from appearing at the grand opening of a retail establishment
109
following their appearance on the show.
A retail establishment
110
offered the pair $10,000 each to appear at its grand opening.
However, the appearance would potentially conflict with CBS sponsor,
111
Target, so they were forced to decline the offer.
Television networks, such as CBS, prevent reality stars not only
from profiting from their publicity commercially, but also from talking
about their lives. Neither a television network nor any other entity
should be able to prevent individuals from talking about a life
experience forever. Essentially, the television networks take away the
right of a person to speak freely about himself or herself. The television
network may argue that participants have the option of not joining the
casts of these reality shows; but for those that do join these casts there
may not be any other viable option for stardom and fame. Television
networks and the NCAA choose to take advantage of, and exploit
Emerging Celebrities who are eager for the once in a lifetime
opportunity of stardom.
V. POTENTIAL FOR STATUTORY INTERVENTION
Contracts that ultimately force a person to sign away his or her
publicity rights for an excessive amount of time should be considered
void and unenforceable. In particular, the law should protect Emerging
Celebrities like student athletes and reality television actors from being
exploited by the major industries. Legal professionals in the sports and
entertainment industry should work together to develop a uniform
statute that will limit the amount of publicity rights that an Emerging
Celebrity can contract away. If states like Indiana–the home of the
NCAA–and New York and California–entertainment hubs–adopted this
uniform statute the college sports and reality television industries may
begin to see fairness for their new stars.

108. Id.
109. James Poniewozik, Back to Reality, TIME, Feb. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056138,00.html.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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A. Proposed Statute
The proposed uniform statute should specifically address the
amateur sports and reality television industries. For each industry, the
statute should specify the number of years that an entity can contract to
utilize a person’s publicity. The statute should also specify the amount
of the person’s publicity rights that the entity may exploit.
For amateur athletics, the statute should take into account that
amateur athletes usually participate in college sports for somewhere
between four to five years, and a small percentage of college athletes
actually go pro. Keeping this in mind, the statute should prohibit
collegiate institutions, athletic associations, and athletic conferences
from exploiting a student athlete’s images for more than two years after
that student athlete stops participating in amateur athletics.
Additionally, the entities should be allowed to enter into an agreement
whereby the student athlete may grant exclusive licensing rights to only
one institution, one athletic association, and one athletic conference.
However, the athlete should not be contractually barred from entering
into agreements with other organizations in other industries. Thereby,
the athlete should be allowed to benefit from executing his own
licensing agreements with other parties, such as videogame and
memorabilia companies.
Some reality television stars only appear on a television show once,
while others repeatedly appear on reunions, network specials events,
and other shows on the network that gave them the initial stardom.
However, it should be noted that many reality stars do not continue to
act outside of their particular reality show or network. Keeping this in
mind, after two years from a reality star’s last recorded season on a
network, the reality star should begin to receive 10% of royalties from
any profits that the television network earns from continually exploiting
that star’s persona into “perpetuity.” Additionally, reality stars should
not be forced to sign contracts that take away their right to tell their
“life stories.” Furthermore, the stars should be allowed to use their
fame in any economic interest they so choose and should not be
prohibited from participating in moneymaking ventures that do not
directly relate to the television industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
In enacting the proposed statute, future amateur athletes and reality
stars may begin to enjoy having control over their own personas and
publicity rights, which is not currently the case in the industries today.
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The proposed statute will keep the various organizations from
essentially trying to take complete control over and ownership of
Emerging Celebrities’ identities. The collegiate institutions, athletics
associations, athletic conferences, and television industry have been
taking advantage of vulnerable athletes and aspiring stars for too long,
and it is time for the legislatures to step in.
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